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Line Drawing and the Bankruptcy Discharge: 
Why Prepetition Stipulations Are Enforceable but 
Prepetition Waivers Are Not* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The legal effect of the discharge is powerful in its simplicity: the 
debtor is freed from the obligation to pay prebankruptcy debts.”1  
Although the consumer debtor has no right to discharge, it is regularly 
granted to debtors who have not run afoul of any of the provisions of  
§ 727(a),2 which is “the heart of the fresh start provisions.”3  When the 
debtor is freed from liability for prepetition debts, the debtor’s creditors 
suffer the loss of nonpayment.  Therefore, creditors desire a bankruptcy 
system that does not overly favor debtors.  In general, the current 
Bankruptcy Code represents an appropriate balance between prodebtor 
and procreditor views.  Despite the balance, creditors continue in their 
attempts to circumvent the bankruptcy discharge, which has the potential 
to erode the effectiveness of a debtor’s fresh start.  Because the 
automatic stay and discharge injunction prohibit the types of postpetition 
actions a creditor can take to collect a debt, creditors tend to focus their 
efforts on prepetition preventive measures.  The scope of this Comment, 
therefore, is limited to prepetition attempts creditors make to transform a 
debt that is otherwise dischargeable into one that is nondischargeable. 
In particular, the analysis of this Comment is confined to Chapter 7 
consumer cases—the most common type of bankruptcy case.4  This 
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 1. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions 
and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 56 (1990). 
 2. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(12) (2006). 
 3. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 98 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5884. 
 4. For example, the Central District of Illinois reports that in 2009 a total of 10,788 bankruptcy 
cases were filed, of which 8475 were Chapter 7 cases—over 78% were Chapter 7.  Statistics, U.S. 
BANKR. CT.: CENT. DISTRICT OF ILL., http://www.ilcb.uscourts.gov/CMECF/filinGsold/calendar_ 
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Comment demonstrates that both a prepetition waiver of discharge in 
total and a prepetition waiver of discharge of a specific debt are 
unenforceable.  Further, public policy and the purpose behind the 
Bankruptcy Code support the unenforceability of such waivers.  Also, the 
Comment discusses the enforceability of prepetition stipulations in a 
later bankruptcy proceeding and the general collateral estoppel effect that 
state law will grant to those stipulations.  In general, bankruptcy courts 
should grant issue-preclusive effect to state court stipulations because it 
promotes judicial economy and validates the time the state court 
expended in drafting them.  The main objective of this Comment is to 
analyze and compare prebankruptcy waivers and stipulations so that the 
enforcement of one over the other can be justified satisfactorily. 
Part II of this Comment offers a quick overview of the purpose 
behind the bankruptcy system and the background necessary to grasp the 
effect discharge has on debtors and creditors.  Part III discusses 
prepetition waivers and prepetition stipulations in state court judgments.  
In relation to prepetition stipulations, Part III discusses the types of debts 
that are excepted from discharge, the United States Supreme Court’s 
limited guidance on collateral estoppel in dischargeability proceedings, 
and the jurisdiction of courts over the discharge exceptions.  Part IV 
analyzes the enforceability of prepetition waivers and stipulations.  It 
concludes that prepetition waivers of discharge are not and should not be 
enforceable, while also concluding that prepetition stipulations should be 
enforceable and entitled to collateral estoppel effect.  Part IV draws a 
distinction between prepetition waivers and stipulations and 
demonstrates why they should be treated differently in bankruptcy 
dischargeability proceedings. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, the bankruptcy process 
“gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life 
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt.”5  Two recurring themes have 
grown from the preceding statement.  First, to seek relief under the 
                                                                                                                       
stats.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  Also, the Central District of California reports that from 
January 2009 to December 2009, a total of 98,469 cases were filed, of which 75,817 cases were 
Chapter 7—approximately 77% were Chapter 7.  2009 Filings for Central District, U.S. BANKR. 
CT.: CENT. DISTRICT OF CAL., http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/cacb/statistics.nsf/DistrictSumRep? 
ReadForm&Year=2009 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
 5. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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Bankruptcy Code, the debtor must be “honest but unfortunate.”6  Second, 
the purpose of the bankruptcy process is to grant the debtor a fresh start.7  
A debtor takes advantage of bankruptcy by filing a petition, which is 
sometimes referred to as “an order for relief” by the Code.8  Once the 
filing fee has been paid, the petition is considered “filed” and “[a]t that 
instant, a bankruptcy estate is created and an automatic stay on all 
collection actions against the debtor, [and] the debtor’s property” is in 
effect.9 
Once the debtor has completed the bankruptcy process, the court will 
generally grant the debtor a discharge pursuant to § 727(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Although the term is not specifically defined in the 
Code, “a discharge . . . discharges the debtor from all debts that arose 
before the date” the bankruptcy petition was filed.10  However, the 
practical effects of the discharge are covered more fully in § 524(a).  
This section, among other purposes, indicates that the discharge 
“operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of 
an action . . . to collect [or] recover . . . any such debt as a personal 
liability of the debtor.”11  The previous injunction is permanent and will 
prevent a creditor from later asserting that the debtor is still responsible 
for payment.12  The effect of the discharge, therefore, is sweeping. 
As stated above, the bankruptcy system has been created to assist 
“the honest but unfortunate debtor.”13  The negative implication of the 
Supreme Court’s statement is that the Bankruptcy Code will not assist a 
dishonest debtor, and numerous sections have been included in the Code 
                                                     
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (“One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor 
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations 
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’” (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915))). 
 8. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 115 (6th ed. 2009) (“In order to begin a bankruptcy case, 
the debtor files a petition.  The petition is the basic register for bankruptcy relief . . . .”); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 301(b) (2006) (“The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this title 
constitutes an order for relief . . . .”). 
 9. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 116. 
 10. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. § 524(a)(2). 
 12. See, e.g., Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Gurrola (In re Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 175 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the discharge injunction protects the debtor from personal 
liability).  This case is also a good example of debtors’ misunderstanding regarding the effect and 
extent of the discharge injunction.  Id. at 160 (“Ignorance.  Pure ignorance.  The debtor was 
amazingly ignorant of the legal consequences of his bankruptcy discharge.”). 
 13. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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to prevent such a possibility.14  Because the underlying purpose of the 
Code is to give the honest debtor a fresh start, many creditors, especially 
unsecured creditors, end up with the bad end of the deal.  Therefore, 
some creditors have attempted to circumvent the discharge provisions of 
the Code by requiring the debtor to waive discharge of a specific debt 
long before the debtor even contemplates filing for bankruptcy.  Other 
creditors file a prebankruptcy lawsuit against the debtor and get a state 
court judgment or consent decree entered.  These prebankruptcy actions 
and their enforceability (and authority) are the subject of Parts III and IV 
of this Comment. 
III. DISCUSSION OF PREBANKRUPTCY ACTIONS BY CREDITORS 
A. Prepetition Waivers of a Specific Debt 
Waivers of dischargeability of a specific debt are attempted 
frequently in prebankruptcy proceedings.  Undoubtedly, prepetition 
waivers of dischargeability are desirable in agreements and court 
judgments because the creditor wants assurance that the debtor will be 
required to pay the debt and not escape that obligation by filing for 
bankruptcy.  Therefore, the creditor is seeking waiver of a single debt 
rather than a waiver of discharge of all debts.  A creditor, for example, 
may negotiate a term into an agreement or judgment that plainly states: 
“The debts incurred in this agreement are nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy.”  Although parties can include prepetition waivers in 
virtually any settlement agreement,15 this Comment refers to two 
contexts where these waivers are recurring. 
                                                     
 14. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (disallowing a debtor to discharge any debts obtained by 
fraud); id. § 727(a)(2) (withholding discharge when the debtor has defrauded an officer of the 
estate); id. § 707(b)(1) (allowing dismissal if “the granting of relief would be an abuse of the 
provisions of this Chapter”); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 279 (1991) (stating that “the 
Code limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor by exempting certain debts from discharge”). 
 15. See, e.g., Herz v. Steil (In re Steil), Bankr. No. 05-02079, Adv. No. 05-9108, 2006 WL 
2662694, at *1–2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Aug. 14, 2006).  The debtors entered into a lease agreement for 
a convenience store with the plaintiff.  Id. at *1.  Debtors suddenly closed the business and failed to 
remit any payment to the plaintiff.  Id. at *2.  The parties then entered into a hand-written settlement 
agreement, which stated that the “agreement is binding by its signer and cancels all leases and 
contracts made prior to today [sic] agreement.  This agreement is not to be included in any 
Bankruptcy Discharge.”  Id. 
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1. Marital Separation Agreements and Divorce Decrees 
One area of the law where a prepetition waiver of the 
dischargeability of a certain debt arises is in the context of marital 
settlement agreements.  Divorce proceedings can be difficult and 
protracted for the parties involved.  One common component of these 
settlement agreements is support obligations.  Support obligations 
commonly include spousal and child support, where a monthly payment 
is made directly to the ex-spouse in a predetermined amount as set by the 
marital settlement agreement.16  In drafting a marital settlement 
agreement, an attorney may include a provision that attempts to make the 
agreed obligations nondischargeable in bankruptcy.  Not surprisingly 
then, “[b]ankruptcy law, with its underlying policy to provide the honest 
debtor with a fresh start, frequently collides with divorce law and the 
mutual obligations that arise from dissolution of a marriage.”17 
In Lewis v. Trump (In re Trump), one attempt at a prepetition waiver 
was included in a marital settlement and separation agreement’s 
“General Provisions,” indicating that “[t]he provisions and obligations 
contained herein are to be considered as not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.”18  Under the agreement, the ex-husband agreed to pay child 
support and, under another section titled “Assumption of Debts and 
Liabilities,” agreed to make monthly payments on a second mortgage, 
even though his ex-wife would retain the residence.19  When the debtor 
ex-husband filed for bankruptcy, the ex-wife filed a complaint to 
determine the dischargeability of the debts that had been agreed upon in 
their marital settlement agreement.20  Specifically, the ex-wife urged the 
court to honor the waiver of discharge contained in the agreement so that 
the debtor ex-husband would be barred from discharging those debts.21  
The court concluded that “prepetition agreements to waive the benefits of 
a bankruptcy discharge are void, and this Court is not bound by this 
language.”22 
                                                     
 16. Daniel A. Austin, For Debtor or Worse: Discharge of Marital Debt Obligations Under the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1369, 1382 
(2005). 
 17. Lewis v. Trump (In re Trump), 309 B.R. 585, 591 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004). 
 18. Id. at 590. 
 19. Id. at 589. 
 20. Id. at 588–89. 
 21. Id. at 593. 
 22. Id. 
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In another case, Cotten v. Cotten (In re Cotten), the parties attempted 
to insert a prepetition waiver of discharge into a consensual divorce 
decree.23  The decree mandated that the ex-husband would make second 
mortgage payments on behalf of his ex-wife and that “such obligation 
shall . . . not [be] dischargeable in bankruptcy.”24  Ultimately, the court 
did not determine whether the provision was enforceable, although it 
agreed with the ex-husband that such waivers had been held 
unenforceable in other jurisdictions.25  Instead, the court concluded that it 
“need not decide whether the provision is enforceable” as other grounds 
existed for making the debt nondischargeable.26 
Lastly, in Hester v. Daniel (In re Daniel), the debtor-wife and 
plaintiff-husband entered into a settlement agreement incorporated into a 
divorce decree.27  As a part of the settlement, the debtor was required to 
pay half of what the parties owed in credit card debt, totaling 
$17,303.24.28  Further, the agreement specifically provided: 
The Defendant expressly waives her right to discharge the debt to the 
Plaintiff as set forth herein under any of the United States Bankruptcy 
laws and the Defendant expressly agrees to not list or include the 
indebtedness to the Plaintiff as set forth herein on any Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy that she may file, it being the express intent of 
the parties that said indebtedness not be dischargeable under the 
Bankruptcy laws of the United States.29 
The defendant made a total of three payments and subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy.30  The plaintiff filed an “Objection to Dischargeability,” 
claiming that the debtor had waived her right to discharge the obligations 
to plaintiff in the prior settlement agreement.31  The plaintiff did not 
convince the bankruptcy court that the waiver provisions of the 
agreement were enforceable.32  The court concluded that “pre-petition 
waivers of protection afforded by a bankruptcy case” were not permitted 
                                                     
 23. 318 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2004). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 587 (“Certainly, waivers of discharge have been held to be unenforceable.”). 
 26. Id. at 586–87 (finding that “the parties’ shared intent at the time of the divorce [was] that 
the Defendant’s obligation was for support” and therefore was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.  
§ 523(a)(5) (2006)). 
 27. 290 B.R. 914, 915 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003). 
 28. Id. at 915–16. 
 29. Id. at 916. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 915, 919. 
 32. Id. at 919. 
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by courts.33  Even with the above careful drafting in the settlement 
agreement, the court still did not uphold the prepetition waiver.34 
2. Attorney’s Fees 
As discussed in Part II, the bankruptcy discharge removes any 
personal liability to pay a prepetition debt.35  Generally, any attorney’s 
fees that the debtor has incurred, such as prepetition bankruptcy 
attorney’s fees, as well as any other attorney’s fees that were owed 
before the case was filed, will be discharged at the close of the 
bankruptcy case.36  As a result, “[a]bsent a specific exception to 
discharge under § 523, the lawyer who furnishes pre-petition bankruptcy 
services and who is unpaid for such services is in the same boat with 
other unpaid pre-petition creditors.”37  Attorneys, of course, dislike such 
an outcome, and some commentators have called for a reform of § 523(a) 
to include an exception for attorney’s fees.38  However, because the 
majority of courts hold that prepetition attorney’s fees are 
dischargeable,39 some attorneys have attempted to require a waiver of 
dischargeability of any debts incurred in representing the debtor before 
the petition is filed. 
                                                     
 33. Id. at 920. 
 34. Id. at 922. 
 35. See Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Gurrola (In re Gurrola), 328 B.R. 158, 175 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 36. In re Nieves, 246 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Kerry Haydel Ducey, Note, Bankruptcy, Just for the Rich? An Analysis of Popular Fee 
Arrangements for Pre-petition Legal Fees and a Call to Amend, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1699 
(2001) (“Congress must amend § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code to exempt unpaid, pre-petition 
bankruptcy attorney’s fees from discharge.”); Joshua D. Morse, Comment, Public Policy Is Never a 
Substitute for Statutory Clarity: Rejecting the Notion that Pre-petition Attorney-Fee Debts Are 
Nondischargeable in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 575, 606–07 (2000) 
(proposing that Congress “address the issue of dischargeability of pre-petition attorney-fee debts”); 
see generally James L. Neher, Comment, Rethinking the Discharge of Pre-petition Attorney Fees in 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: A Debtor Oriented Perspective, 6 D.C. L. REV. 91 (2001) (advocating “the 
minority view” that “attorney fees in connection with preparing and filing a bankruptcy are not 
dischargeable whether prepaid or not, as long as they are not excessive”). 
 39. See, e.g., Hessinger & Assocs. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“Section 523’s failure to except debts for attorneys’ fees from the Code’s discharge provisions leads 
us to conclude that the debts at issue in this case are dischargeable.”); In re Nieves, 246 B.R. at 872 
(stating that “[t]he great weight of authority holds that a chapter 7 discharge covers attorney’s fees 
owed by a debtor for services involved in preparation for filing the bankruptcy case”); In re Martin, 
197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) (“Had Congress intended to create an exception to 
discharge for unpaid attorney fees presumably it would appear in § 523.”); see also Neher, supra 
note 38, at 95–96 (discussing the minority view). 
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For example, in In re Nieves, the debtor and his wife met with an 
attorney to assist them in their decision whether to file for bankruptcy.40  
Due to the urgency of their situation, the attorney suggested that they file 
immediately and discussed two options for payment of legal fees in 
connection with the case.41  The first option required the debtors to make 
a full up front payment before they filed the petition.42  The second 
option required a monthly payroll deduction that would begin after they 
filed the bankruptcy petition.43  The debtors chose the second option and 
signed an agreement under which the debtors would be personally liable 
postpetition in the event that the deductions were not forwarded to the 
attorney.44  After examination of the bankruptcy case, the U.S. Trustee 
challenged the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees.45  The bankruptcy 
court then concluded that prepetition attorney’s fees were dischargeable 
and that “[t]he provision in the agreement . . . which obligated the 
debtors to pay the entire fee [was] unenforceable.”46 
The debtor, in Marra, Gerstein & Richman v. Kroen (In re Kroen), 
allegedly made an oral representation to his attorney, who had been 
representing him in a matrimonial matter spanning several years, that he 
would not discharge the attorney’s bill in bankruptcy.47  The debtor 
denied making the statement, pointing to his financial deterioration 
during the years of the divorce and the large amount of fees he owed to 
the attorney: $43,166 in total and $14,343 at the time of his bankruptcy 
filing.48  The bankruptcy court, with an attempt at humor, concluded, 
“the representation of waiver of discharge (if made), was not worth the 
paper it was not written on.”49  The court, in discussing the 
unenforceability of the prepetition waiver, discussed § 524(c) as “the 
only mechanism by which a debtor may ‘waive’ discharge of a specific 
debt.”50 
                                                     
 40. 246 B.R. at 869. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 868. 
 46. Id. at 872 (stating that “in 11 U.S.C. § 523, there is no exception to discharge for pre-
petition attorney’s fees”). 
 47. 280 B.R. 347, 349 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 353. 
 50. Id. at 352.  Although § 524(c) can be used to waive the dischargeability of a particular debt, 
it is important to note that these agreements (referred to as reaffirmation agreements) may only occur 
postpetition.  11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (2006) (stating that the agreement must be entered into before 
the discharge injunction is operable). 
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B. Prepetition Stipulations and Judgments in State Courts 
1. The Judicial Origins of Stipulations as Relevant to Dischargeability 
In an often-cited footnote, the Seventh Circuit, in Klingman v. 
Levinson, noted: “For public policy reasons, a debtor may not contract 
away the right to a discharge . . . . [but] a debtor may stipulate to the 
underlying facts that the bankruptcy court must examine to determine 
whether a debt is dischargeable.”51  A stipulation has been defined as “[a] 
voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant 
point.”52  By extension, a stipulation to the underlying facts would be an 
agreement where the parties negotiate and approve specific relevant 
facts, which then would be incorporated into a consent decree or 
judgment.  For example, in Klingman, the consent judgment stipulated: 
That Defendant [Mr. Levinson], in disregard of his fiduciary duties and 
obligations as Trustee, has failed to retain and conserve the said trust 
corpus and income therefrom, but rather, in violation of and disregard 
of his fiduciary duties and obligations as Trustee, has, through his 
misappropriation and defalcation, allowed or caused the dissipation and 
loss of the said trust corpus and income therefrom.53 
The facts a court could gather from the above stipulation include: (1) Mr. 
Levinson was a trustee of an express trust; (2) through misappropriation 
and defalcation Mr. Levinson created a debt that was owed to the 
beneficiaries; and (3) Mr. Levinson, as trustee, acted in a fiduciary 
capacity when the debt was created.54  A bankruptcy court, armed with 
the previous stipulations from the prior state court consent judgment, 
could easily conclude that “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity” has been committed.55  In an adversary proceeding, the 
bankruptcy court can use those specifically stipulated facts to conclude 
that a debt is nondischargeable because one of the exceptions to 
discharge is applicable.  Although these exceptions encumber a debtor’s  
 
                                                     
 51. 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 52. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1550 (9th ed. 2009). 
 53. Klingman, 831 F.2d at 1293. 
 54. “To establish that a debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), a creditor must 
establish that: 1) an express trust existed, 2) the debt was caused by fraud or defalcation, and 3) the 
debtor acted as a fiduciary to the creditor at the time the debt was created.”  Id. at 1295. 
 55. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (an exception to discharge is available when the debtor, while 
acting as a fiduciary, commits a fraud or defalcation that causes a debt). 
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fresh start, Congress has enacted them for a public policy reason that 
supersedes the fresh start policy. 
2. Congress Has Determined Certain Debts Are Nondischargeable 
“Generally, all debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy unless 
specifically excepted by a provision in the Bankruptcy Code.”56  The 
“exceptions to discharge” alluded to in the previous statement are located 
in § 523(a), which lists twenty debts that are considered 
nondischargeable by Congress.57  Originally, the exceptions from 
discharge were listed in section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and 
were limited to four categories of debt: taxes owed to the government; 
debts concerning fraud, false pretenses, false representations or malicious 
injury to property of another; those not scheduled in the bankruptcy; and 
debts that were produced by fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or 
defalcation.58  Section 523(a) has been amended and expanded over time 
to include the twenty present grounds under which a debt may become 
nondischargeable.59 
“Congress evidently concluded that the creditors’ interest in 
recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the 
debtors’ interest in a complete fresh start.”60  Further, “Congress did not 
intend the Code’s fresh start policy to provide a haven for the dishonest 
debtor.”61  Therefore, the exceptions listed in § 523(a) are not standard 
debts, such as an unsecured credit card debt.  They have been excluded 
from discharge because, in many cases, their exception is supported by 
some public policy rationale, they were enacted to respond to an abuse 
observed by Congress, or “special interest groups . . . lobbied for [the] 
exception.”62  These exceptions, however, “should not be read more 
broadly than necessary to effectuate policy.”63 
                                                     
 56. Klingman, 831 F.2d at 1296 n.3. 
 57. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)–(19).  To clarify, § 523(a) includes twenty grounds because  
§ 523(a)(14) is split into (14A) and (14B), which are unrelated subsections.  Id. 
 58. 4 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.LH[1] (15th ed. rev. 2009). 
 59. See generally id. (discussing the legislative history of § 523). 
 60. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (“The statutory provisions governing 
nondischargeability reflect a congressional decision to exclude from the general policy of discharge 
certain categories of debts—such as child support, alimony, and certain unpaid educational loans and 
taxes, as well as liabilities for fraud.”). 
 61. Lee Blake, Note, St. Laurent v. Ambrose: No Haven for the Fraudulent Debtor, 26 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 561, 566 (1994) (citing St. Laurent v. Ambrose, 991 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir. 1993)). 
 62. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 230. 
 63. Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 654 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
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Section 523(a)(5), the exception of domestic support obligations, is 
an easy example to demonstrate the public policy rationale that 
commonly upholds the subsections of 523(a).64  Congress and 
bankruptcy courts have treated domestic support differently than other 
types of debt because of “the vulnerability of former spouses and 
dependents.”65  The spousal support exception was first established by 
the Supreme Court in 190166 and was expanded in 1903 to include child 
support obligations.67  These judicial exceptions were incorporated into 
the Bankruptcy Code under section 17a(2) in 1903.68  The longevity of 
such exceptions “reflect[s] a congressional preference for the rights of 
spouses to alimony, maintenance or support over the rights of debtors to 
a fresh start.”69 
Each of the remaining § 523(a) exceptions is also supported by some 
public policy rationale that outweighs any resulting burden on the debtor 
postbankruptcy.  Some exceptions are included because they are debts 
owed to the government—such as tax debts,70 fines, or penalties71—
while others acknowledge some culpable conduct—like a debt for money 
obtained by false pretenses,72 willful and malicious injury to another,73 
and death or personal injury caused by driving while intoxicated.74  
Despite this procreditor section of the Code, “[a] creditor seeking to have 
a debt determined to be nondischargeable under section 523 bears the 
burden of proving each element by clear and convincing evidence.”75 
Consequently, a prudent creditor, falling victim to some offense 
committed by the debtor and understanding that the debtor may file for 
bankruptcy in the future, may file a lawsuit in state court where the 
parties stipulate to the underlying facts.  In doing so, a creditor should 
reference § 523(a) and determine whether any of the twenty subsections 
                                                     
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006) (“A discharge under section 727 . . . does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt for a domestic support obligation . . . .”). 
 65. Austin, supra note 16, at 1384. 
 66. Id. (citing Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 580 (1901)). 
 67. Id. (citing Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 353 (1903)). 
 68. 4 KING ET AL., supra note 58, ¶ 523.LH[1]. 
 69. Austin, supra note 16, at 1388. 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2006). 
 71. Id. § 523(a)(7). 
 72. Id. § 523(a)(2). 
 73. Id. § 523(a)(6). 
 74. Id. § 523(a)(9). 
 75. Doug Howle’s Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Ethridge (In re Ethridge), 80 B.R. 581, 586 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (“Complaints on dischargeability are strictly construed against creditors 
because exceptions to dischargeability frustrate the fresh start and rehabilitative purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). 
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are available.  If one of the subsections is applicable, the stipulations 
should be drafted so that each element of the § 523(a) claim is proved.  
For example, in continuing with the Klingman facts above,76 the creditor 
purposefully crafted the factual stipulations to prove the elements of a  
§ 523(a)(4) “defalcation by trustee” claim.77  “To establish that a debt is 
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), a creditor must establish 
that: 1) an express trust existed, 2) the debt was caused by fraud or 
defalcation, and 3) the debtor acted as a fiduciary to the creditor at the 
time the debt was created.”78  The factual stipulations in Klingman 
conclusively established the elements of § 523(a)(4); therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit determined that the consent judgment proved the debt 
was nondischargeable.79  In reaching its conclusion, however, the 
Seventh Circuit also had to conclude that the consent judgment was 
entitled to collateral estoppel effect.80  “Despite [the] guidance by the 
Supreme Court, there is disagreement among the courts regarding the 
collateral estoppel effect accorded state court judgments in bankruptcy 
proceedings involving dischargeability.”81 
3. Supreme Court Authority on Collateral Estoppel and State Court 
Judgments 
“[C]ollateral estoppel treats as final only those questions actually and 
necessarily decided in a prior suit.”82  It has been described as narrower 
than res judicata, which “forecloses all that which might have been 
litigated previously.”83  Fairly limited guidance can be derived from 
Supreme Court case law regarding issue preclusion and state court 
judgments in the context of bankruptcy law.  The Supreme Court has 
concluded, in a case unrelated to bankruptcy, “settlements ordinarily 
occasion no issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel), 
                                                     
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 77. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (“A discharge under section 727 . . . does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt . . . for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, 
or larceny . . . .”). 
 78. Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 79. Id. at 1296 (“The bankruptcy court and the district court therefore properly applied the 
principle of collateral estoppel and correctly held that the appellant’s debt was not dischargeable 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).”). 
 80. Id. at 1295. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 
147, 153 (1979)). 
 83. Id. 
BALLOBIN FINAL 1/2/2011  12:44:41 PM 
2011] LINE DRAWING AND THE BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 381 
unless it is clear . . . that the parties intended their agreement to have 
such an effect.”84  Therefore, it appears that the Court would support the 
view held by courts that give issue-preclusive effect only upon a finding 
of intent.85  In the context of bankruptcy and dischargeability, the Court 
has, in dictum, stated that if factual issues previously litigated in state 
court mirror the analysis applied in the bankruptcy proceeding, the 
bankruptcy court should give effect to those previous state court 
determinations.86  The Court later stated that “[w]e now clarify that 
collateral estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge exception 
proceedings pursuant to § 523(a).”87  The courts, however, have come to 
different conclusions regarding the extent of the previous statement due 
to the “bankruptcy courts’ exclusive jurisdiction in determining 
dischargeability.”88 
4. The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts in 
Nondischargeability 
A stipulation to the underlying facts can occur in one of two possible 
proceedings.  First, a consent judgment may occur in nondischargeability 
litigation that takes place in bankruptcy court.  In such a situation, federal 
law would apply “regarding the issue-preclusive effect of the 
judgment.”89  Second, a consent judgment may be entered in a state court 
proceeding before the debtor has even filed a bankruptcy petition.  In this 
second situation, “the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a 
subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is determined by the preclusion law 
of the state in which the judgment was issued.”90  It is the latter situation 
that has caused a divergence between the courts. 
                                                     
 84. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000). 
 85. But cf. Simmons Capital Advisors v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 393 B.R. 522, 536 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (“The United States Supreme Court has, as a matter of federal law, come 
down squarely in the ‘no-preclusive-effect’ camp.”).  Because the bankruptcy court focuses on the 
general rule cited by the Court but ignores the earlier qualifying statement regarding the intent of the 
parties, I consider the Supreme Court to fall within Camp Two rather than Camp One.  Id. 
 86. Brown, 442 U.S. at 139 n.10 (“If, in the course of adjudicating a state-law question, a state 
court should determine factual issues using standards identical to those of § 17, then collateral 
estoppel, in the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of those issues in 
the bankruptcy court.”). 
 87. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991). 
 88. Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987) (comparing different 
jurisdictions’ conclusions regarding collateral estoppel in dischargeability proceedings). 
 89. Simmons, 393 B.R. at 536. 
 90. Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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An emphasis has been placed on the distinction between the two 
previous situations because generally, “the question of the 
dischargeability of the debt is not in issue” in the state court 
proceeding.91  Further, the bankruptcy courts are particularly well-suited 
to determine the dischargeability of debts and to analyze the exceptions 
enumerated in § 523(a).92  However, “[b]efore 1970, the bankruptcy 
courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts to decide whether 
debts were excepted from discharge.”93  But, in practice, the state courts 
more frequently determined the dischargeability of debts.94  When the 
Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1970, the jurisdiction over certain 
exceptions was placed exclusively with the bankruptcy courts.95  More 
specifically, under § 523(c)(1) of the Code, bankruptcy courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of debts excluded 
through § 523(a)(2), (4) and (6).96  Section 523(c)(1) states: 
Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor 
shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4) 
or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor 
to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court 
determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph 
(2), (4) or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.97 
The above section requires that a creditor litigate the nondischargeability 
of those claims in bankruptcy court, and if not challenged during the 
                                                     
 91. Saler v. Saler (In re Saler), 205 B.R. 737, 745–46 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 217 B.R. 
166 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 92. See Klingman, 831 F.2d at 1294 (“The Court further stated that the dischargeability of the 
debt was an issue that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts, rather than the state courts, to 
decide.” (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979))). 
 93. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.10 (1991). 
 94. Id. (“In practice, however, bankruptcy courts generally refrained from deciding whether 
particular debts were excepted and instead allowed those questions to be litigated in the state 
courts.”). 
 95. Id. (“The 1970 amendments took jurisdiction over certain dischargeability exceptions, 
including the exceptions for fraud, away from the state courts and vested jurisdiction exclusively in 
the bankruptcy courts.”).  The purpose of taking jurisdiction away from state courts was “to give 
those claims to the bankruptcy court so that it could develop expertise in handling them” rather than 
having state courts with less expertise in federal bankruptcy laws address them.  Brown v. Felsen, 
442 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1979). 
 96. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2006). 
 97. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6321; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 80 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865–66 (stating that 
§ 523(c)(1) “requires a creditor who is owed a debt that may be excepted from discharge under 
paragraph (2), (4), or (6) . . . to initiate proceedings in the bankruptcy court for an exception to 
discharge”). 
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debtor’s case, the debt will be discharged.98  Alternatively, both the 
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy forums have concurrent jurisdiction 
regarding the rest of the exceptions to discharge in § 523(a).99  Therefore, 
within those exceptions, creditors “may seek a nondischargeability 
determination in the bankruptcy court, but are not required to do so.”100  
As a result, a split has developed between courts regarding the issue-
preclusive effect of a judgment entered in a state court proceeding rather 
than in a bankruptcy court.101 
5. The Three Collateral Estoppel Camps 
Although federal appeals courts have generally applied the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel in dischargeability proceedings,102 their conclusions 
on the matter are not dispositive in the context of bankruptcy.  “Under 
the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the preclusive effect of a 
state court judgment in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding is 
determined by the preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was 
issued.”103  Even though state courts share a common understanding of 
the meaning, states have widely differing requirements in applying 
collateral estoppel.104  Generally, state courts require that the issue be 
identical in both proceedings, the issue was actually litigated, and the 
determination in the state court was necessary and final.105  Despite the 
                                                     
 98. Whitehouse v. LaRoche, 277 F.3d 568, 576 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 99. See id. at 578 (finding that when the exception is not one “of the four waivable exceptions 
to discharge, however, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is concurrent, hence nonexclusive”). 
 100. Id. at 576. 
 101. Simmons Capital Advisors v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 393 B.R. 522, 536 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 2008) (“The issue of whether consent judgments have issue-preclusive effect has divided the 
courts . . . .”). 
 102. See Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2001); Laganella v. 
Braen (In re Braen), 900 F.2d 621, 630 (3d Cir. 1990); Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 114–15 
(4th Cir. 1988); Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295–96 (7th Cir. 1987); Harold V. Simpson 
& Co. v. Shuler (In re Shuler), 722 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1984); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 
604 (10th Cir. 1983); Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983); Spilman v. Harley, 656 
F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 103. In re Baldwin, 249 F.3d at 917; Spartz v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 178 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 1995) (“A number of bankruptcy courts, including the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 
Ninth Circuit, have recently concluded that state-law, not federal-law, doctrine controls the 
application of collateral estoppel.”). 
 104. See Bachinski, 393 B.R. at 535 (listing the four requirements under Ohio law for issue 
preclusion application); In re Baldwin, 249 F.3d at 917–19 (listing the five threshold requirements 
California imposes plus collateral estoppel application must further public policy considerations); 
Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 222 B.R. 685, 687 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (listing two basic 
requirements for collateral estoppel). 
 105. See, e.g., Cobb v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 271 B.R. 877, 877–79 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002). 
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previous general principle, “[s]ome courts . . . will give no collateral 
estoppel effect to state court determinations, while other courts do apply 
collateral estoppel when the issue was litigated previously by the 
parties.”106  In fact, the courts have generally fallen into “three camps”: 
one group will not give issue-preclusive effect to state court consent 
judgments (Camp One), another will give issue-preclusive effect if the 
parties clearly indicate that the consent judgment is to be given such 
effect (Camp Two), and the last group generally will give issue-
preclusive effect (Camp Three).107 
a. Camp One: No Issue-Preclusive Effect to State Court Judgments 
A minority of courts will not grant collateral estoppel effect to state 
court consent judgments.  Camp One courts identify two separate 
grounds to support their reasoning: (1) the bankruptcy courts are given 
exclusive jurisdiction of certain dischargeability determinations,108 and 
(2) the actually litigated requirement bars collateral estoppel application 
to consent judgments containing factual stipulations.109 
First, some courts have narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional 
difference of § 523(c)(1) in a way that allows them to discount the 
authority of any state court judgments containing stipulations to the 
underlying facts, particularly when § 524(a)(2), (4) and (6) are 
involved.110  These courts conduct their own review of the facts and 
determine whether the requirements of that section are present before the 
dischargeability of a debt is established, giving little, if any, weight to the 
                                                     
 106. Klingman, 831 F.2d at 1295. 
 107. Bachinski, 393 B.R. at 536 (indicating that “three camps” exist regarding consent judgments 
and issue-preclusive effect). 
 108. See, e.g., Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). 
 109. See, e.g., Word v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 203 B.R. 640, 643 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996). 
 110. See, e.g., Gregg v. Rahm (In re Rahm), 641 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that 
“prior state court judgment has no collateral estoppel force on a bankruptcy court considering 
dischargeability unless both parties agree to rest their cases on that judgment”), abrogated by 
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Hayhoe, 226 B.R. at 653 (holding that “the bankruptcy 
court must make a determination regarding the dischargeability” of the debt “notwithstanding a state 
court stipulated judgment”); Saler v. Saler (In re Saler), 205 B.R. 737, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) 
(“[I]n this circuit, it has long been held that prepetition judgments entered by default do not 
determine, as a matter of issue preclusion . . . the nondischargeability of a debt.”), aff’d, 217 B.R. 
166 (E.D. Pa. 1998).  Collateral estoppel also may not be granted to consent judgments by some 
states for failure to comply with the “actually litigated” requirement.  See, e.g., Aslakson v. 
Anderson (In re Anderson), 49 B.R. 655, 656 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (applying the reasoning that 
“[a] default judgment is not an adjudication on the merits for collateral estoppel purposes” to consent 
judgments). 
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state court judgment.111  For example, in Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), the 
creditor and debtor entered into a prepetition state court stipulated 
judgment and upon challenge in the bankruptcy dischargeability 
proceedings, the court disregarded the stipulated judgment.112  The court 
ignored the substantive difference between a waiver and a stipulation and 
held the state court stipulated judgment regarding dischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(2) unenforceable.113  The court stated that “if the parties 
stipulated to the underlying facts that support[ed] a finding of 
nondischargeability, the Stipulated Judgment would then be entitled to 
collateral estoppel application.”114  But the weight of that statement is 
severely limited by the court’s subsequent declaration that “the state 
court clearly lacked jurisdiction to litigate a § 523(a)(2) claim” and any 
stipulated facts would nevertheless have been irrelevant.115 
Camp One courts, therefore, distort the meaning of § 523(c)(1) by 
very narrowly construing its language to mean that “a duty exists to 
actually adjudicate dischargeability complaints.”116  These courts state 
the correct intention that “all nondischargeability claims arising under 
sections 523(a)(2), (a)(4) and (a)(6) must be determined by a bankruptcy 
court.”117  They fail to realize, however, that while the state court cannot 
make a final determination on dischargeability, it can undertake all of the 
factual analysis involved in a § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) claim.118 
                                                     
 111. Hayhoe, 226 B.R. at 653 (“Thus, the bankruptcy court must make a determination regarding 
the dischargeability of a § 523(a)(2) claim notwithstanding a state court stipulated judgment . . . .”). 
 112. Id. at 649–50 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision that “the [s]tipulated [j]udgment 
was an unenforceable attempt to prospectively waive the bankruptcy discharge”). 
 113. Id. at 656 (stating that the “stipulated facts were nothing more than an invalid agreement 
that the [d]ebt would be nondischargeable in a future bankruptcy”). 
 114. Id. at 655. 
 115. See id. at 655–56 (concluding that because the state court had no jurisdiction over a  
§ 523(a)(2) claim then the issue could not have been “actually litigated” as required by collateral 
estoppel requirements). 
 116. K-Carpet Co. v. Palumbo (In re Palumbo), Bankr. No. 93-61642, Adv. No. 93-6238, 1994 
WL 127599, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1994). 
 117. Saler v. Saler (In re Saler), 205 B.R. 737, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (“A bankruptcy court 
has exclusive jurisdiction over those claims.”), aff’d, 217 B.R. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Roberti (In re Roberti), 183 B.R. 991, 1000 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) 
(“Some courts have found that federal law creates an exception to the application of state collateral 
estoppel rules when the issue before the bankruptcy court involves dischargeability proceedings that 
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, i.e. proceedings under § 523(a)(2), (4), 
or (6).”). 
 118. Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Although the 
bankruptcy court in a dischargeability action under section 523(a) ultimately determines whether or 
not a debt is dischargeable, we believe that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked to bar 
relitigation of the factual issues underlying the determination of dischargeability . . . .”); Spilman v. 
Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[T]hat Congress intended the bankruptcy court to 
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Second, Camp One courts confine the application of collateral 
estoppel only to state court judgments where the issues were “actually 
litigated.”  For example, in Word v. Bailey (In re Bailey), an Ohio 
bankruptcy court applying Nevada law concluded that a consent 
judgment was not entitled to issue-preclusive effect.119  The plaintiffs had 
hired the debtor “to construct a home for them in Nevada for 
approximately $160,000.”120  When the debtor failed to complete the 
construction of the home, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Nevada state 
court.121  “In Nevada, as well as Ohio, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
precludes parties from litigating an issue that existed in a prior action, 
that was actually litigated in the action, and that was necessary to the 
determination of the prior action.”122  Under Nevada law, a consent 
judgment is an agreement where the parties do not go to trial but instead 
agree on certain facts and conclusions.123  “In Nevada, consent judgments 
are not given preclusive effect through the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel” because the parties never got the chance to litigate the factual 
issues.124 
Among the “three camps,” the narrow interpretation of the Camp 
One courts is least desirable because it requires the parties to relitigate all 
factual claims, even though a state court has already done so.  Further, 
the minority view lacks full consideration of other factors, as 
demonstrated below in Part IV, because it fails to take into account 
judicial economy and the potential chilling effect on state judgments that 
could occur if they are continually overlooked in this matter.125 
b. Camp Two: Issue-Preclusive Effect if Intent Shown 
The jurisdictions allowing state court consent judgments to be 
granted issue-preclusive effect generally seek to reduce the repetitive 
litigation that would occur if bankruptcy courts were required to 
                                                                                                                       
determine the final result—dischargeability or not—does not require the bankruptcy court to 
redetermine all the underlying facts.”). 
 119. 203 B.R. 640, 643 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996). 
 120. Id. at 642. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 643. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (citing Willerton v. Bassham, 889 P.2d 823, 827 n.6 (Nev. 1995)). 
 125. See Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1065 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A] 
chilling effect on consent judgments and settlements might result if the court were to ignore such a 
clear and unambiguous expression of the parties’ intent.” (quoting First Ga. Bank v. Halpern (In re 
Halpern), 50 B.R. 260, 263 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985))). 
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redetermine all facts previously established in the consent decree.126  
Camp Two courts are troubled by the conflict of the “actually litigated” 
requirement of collateral estoppel with consent judgments because the 
judgments are often reached without litigation.127  Although “[i]ssue 
preclusion is generally inappropriate when the prior judgment was a 
consent judgment . . . . [t]he judgment may be conclusive . . . with 
respect to one or more issues, if the parties have entered an agreement 
manifesting that intention.”128  Therefore, Camp Two courts require 
establishment of each element of collateral estoppel plus a clear intent 
that the parties desired the consent judgment be given such effect.129 
In Shaw v. Shaw (In re Shaw), the bankruptcy court applied 
Michigan law in a case where the plaintiff-wife suffered injuries after the 
debtor-husband shot her.130  The parties entered into a consent judgment 
in a state court proceeding, the plaintiff-wife agreeing to a $300,000 
award.131  The following year the debtor-husband filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition, and the plaintiff-wife filed an adversary proceeding 
seeking a nondischargeability determination of the civil remedy based 
upon the consent judgment.132  “Under Michigan law, ‘[f]or collateral 
                                                     
 126. Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Where a state court 
determines factual questions using the same standards as the bankruptcy court would use, collateral 
estoppel should be applied to promote judicial economy by encouraging the parties to present their 
strongest arguments.”). 
 127. Boddiford v. IRS (In re Boddiford), 312 B.R. 827, 829 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2004) (“The 
requirement that the issue be actually litigated does not prevent consent judgments from having 
collateral estoppel effect. . . . In such a situation the intention of the parties is the determining factor 
in satisfying this requirement.”). 
 128. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.03[2][i][i] (3d ed. 
2010). 
 129. In re Halpern, 810 F.2d at 1065 (stating that “the central inquiry in determining the 
preclusive effect of a consent judgment is the intention of the parties as manifested in the judgment 
or other evidence”); Klingman, 831 F.2d at 1296 (“In this situation, it is certainly reasonable to 
conclude that the parties understood the conclusive effect of their stipulation in a future bankruptcy 
proceeding.”); Metro. Steel, Inc. v. Halversen (In re Halversen), 330 B.R. 291, 303 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (stating that “the parties’ intent may be established by determining whether the stipulated 
decision ‘includes sufficient facts to support a finding that a debt is excepted from discharge’” 
(citation omitted)); Kohlenberg v. Baumhaft (In re Baumhaft), 271 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (“Under Michigan law, consent judgments are normally not given collateral estoppel 
effect, unless ‘the parties have entered into an agreement manifesting an intention that the judgment 
be conclusive with respect to one or more of the issues[.]’” (quoting Mustaine v. Kennedy (In re 
Kennedy), 243 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1997))); Meggs v. Booth (In re Booth), 174 B.R. 619, 
623 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994) (“However, if the parties intend that a consent judgment operates as a 
final adjudication and make that binding by stipulation of the ultimate facts, then it satisfies the 
‘actually litigated’ element.”). 
 130. 210 B.R. 992, 995 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1997). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 995–96. 
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estoppel to apply, a question of fact essential to the judgment must have 
been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment.’”133  
Generally, Michigan courts did not accord consent judgments collateral 
estoppel effect.134  The court, however, recognized an exception to the 
general rule, concluding that if the parties clearly manifested “an intent 
to be bound by certain facts, collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of 
those facts.”135  The court concluded that because the consent judgment 
represented nothing more than a “stipulation or recital” of facts lacking 
any intent to be bound, collateral estoppel could not properly apply.136 
Conversely, in Kohlenberg v. Baumhaft (In re Baumhaft), the debtor 
entered into a settlement agreement that was later filed as a consent 
judgment in a state court proceeding.137  The settlement agreement 
determined that the debtor “would not challenge the nondischargeability 
of the Consent Judgment and Supplemental Judgment in any bankruptcy 
proceeding.”138  Later, when the debtor was forced into a Chapter 7 
petition, the other party to the settlement agreement filed an adversary 
proceeding and contended that the debt was nondischargeable because 
the consent decree had preclusive effect.139  Following the reasoning of 
the Seventh Circuit, the court concluded that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact because “the parties did what was required to give 
their consent judgment collateral effect.”140  The consent judgment 
specifically stipulated the facts that were required to establish the 
elements of their claims under § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B).141  The settlement 
agreement contained explicit statements such as, “I intended to deceive 
plaintiffs at the time I made the material misrepresentations” and 
“[p]laintiffs justifiably relied on my material misrepresentations.”142  
More specifically, as required by Michigan law, the parties signified a 
clear and unambiguous intent that the debt be nondischargeable.143  
                                                     
 133. Id. at 998 (quoting Nummer v. Treasury Dep’t, 533 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. 1995)). 
 134. Id. (“A consent judgment is considered a settlement rather than a fully litigated lawsuit, in 
that ‘nothing is adjudicated between the two parties to a consent judgment.’” (citation omitted)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 999. 
 137. 271 B.R. 517, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 520. 
 140. Id. at 522. 
 141. Id. at 523. 
 142. Id. at 522. 
 143. Id. (“The Consent Judgment, Settlement Agreement, and Stipulation of Facts all clearly 
manifest an intention that the parties be bound by their agreement in a future bankruptcy 
proceeding.”). 
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Therefore, the bankruptcy court gave collateral estoppel effect to the 
stipulated facts in the consent judgment.144 
c. Camp Three: Issue-Preclusive Effect 
Camp Three courts hold “that where all the requirements of 
collateral estoppel are met, collateral estoppel should preclude 
relitigation of factual issues.”145  Unlike courts in Camp Two, these 
courts require no clear manifestation of intent because they consider 
stipulations to the underlying facts contained in a consent judgment a 
“final judgment on the merits.”146  Therefore, the factual issues within 
the consent decree have been litigated for collateral estoppel purposes.147  
As long as “the facts admitted in the state court judgment contained all of 
the elements necessary for a determination of nondischargeability” and 
each of the elements of collateral estoppel is established, issue preclusion 
is proper.148 
In Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), before the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy, a state court entered a judgment against the debtor for fraud 
and conversion.149  The plaintiff then instituted an adversary proceeding 
in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, seeking a determination that collateral 
estoppel applied to the state court judgment.150  In bankruptcy court, the 
plaintiff claimed that the state court judgment established the elements 
necessary to prove the debt nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).151  The 
Tenth Circuit stated the following requirements of collateral estoppel: 
“(1) the issue to be precluded is the same as that involved in the prior 
                                                     
 144. Id. (finding that “the parties did what was required to give their consent judgment collateral 
estoppel effect”). 
 145. Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 146. Rein v. Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Am. Equip. Corp. 
v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1980) (“‘Judicial decrees disposing of issues in 
active litigation cannot be treated as idle ceremonies denigrating the judicial process.’” (quoting 
Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846, 849 (2d Cir. 1976))); Pac. Energy & 
Minerals, Ltd. v. Austin (In re Austin), 93 B.R. 723, 727 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (“A consent 
judgment or stipulation and agreement entered as a Court Order, for example, can constitute a final 
adjudication on dischargeability issues.”). 
 147. Rein, 270 F.3d at 903. 
 148. Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 1987); see also 
Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that “stipulations in the consent 
judgment clearly establish that the debt is nondischargeable”). 
 149. 840 F.2d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2006) (listing a debt as nondischargeable if it 
incurred through embezzlement). 
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state action, (2) the issue was actually litigated . . . and (3) the state 
court’s determination of the issue was necessary to the resulting final and 
valid judgment.”152  The court concluded that collateral estoppel applied 
and further determined that “no countervailing statutory policy . . . would 
prevent application of the doctrine.”153  Also, because the state court 
judgment established each element of the embezzlement claim, the debt 
was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).154 
Additionally, Camp Three courts will, in appropriate circumstances, 
apply collateral estoppel to default judgments entered in state courts.155  
For example, a bankruptcy court in the District of Kansas recently 
determined that a default judgment should be entitled to preclusive effect 
when the debtor failed to appear in the state civil action.156  The debtor 
issued a check to obtain possession of her vehicle from the plaintiff who 
had performed repairs.157  The issued check was drawn upon the account, 
which had been previously closed, and therefore insufficient funds 
existed to pay the check.158  The plaintiff filed a civil action, and when 
the debtor failed to appear, the state court entered a default judgment, 
specifically concluding that the “defendant obtained goods and services 
from the plaintiff through fraud.”159  When the debtor filed a voluntary 
Chapter 7 petition, the plaintiff commenced a dischargeability 
proceeding in the bankruptcy court and claimed that the state court 
default judgment established “the fraud discharge exception as provided 
in § 523(a)(2)(A).”160  The bankruptcy court concluded that the elements 
of actual fraud had been established by the state court judgment161 and 
the elements required for collateral estoppel in Kansas were present;162 
                                                     
 152. In re Wallace, 840 F.2d at 765. 
 153. Id. at 764–65. 
 154. Id. at 765 (listing the elements necessary to establish embezzlement). 
 155. Bay Area Factors v. Calvert (In re Calvert), 105 F.3d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[C]reditor 
may utilize collateral estoppel to prevent litigation of the dischargeability of a debt after obtaining a 
default judgment on claims of fraud in state court.”); Tracy’s Auto. Corp. v. Sakari (In re Sakari), 
Ch. 7 Case No. 08-12498, Adv. No. 08-5296, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2009); Spartz v. 
Cornell (In re Cornell), 178 B.R. 45, 49 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995). 
 156. Tracy’s Auto. Corp., slip op. at 7–8. 
 157. Id. at 3. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 7. 
 160. Id. at 5. 
 161. Id. at 6 (stating that “the plaintiff has established all of these elements of actual fraud by the 
requests for admission and the application of collateral estoppel to the state court judgment”). 
 162. Id. at 6–7. 
For collateral estoppel to apply under Kansas law, the following elements must be 
present: (1) a prior judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of 
the parties based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the 
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therefore, the default judgment “preclude[d] relitigation of the fraud 
issue.”163 
Again, the challenge is that most state collateral estoppel doctrines 
require that the issue have been “actually litigated”164 in the state court 
proceeding.  These courts are often able to overcome the previous 
obstacle based upon some failure to act by the debtor, such as not 
appearing for trial.165  Also, courts have indicated that “an actual trial is 
not imperative.”166  Courts, however, will not grant collateral estoppel 
effect to all default judgments, especially if the judgment resulted from 
some error or lack of due process.167  In K-Carpet Co. v. Palumbo (In re 
Palumbo), the bankruptcy court refused to apply collateral estoppel 
effect to a default judgment because the state court had awarded it on the 
basis of a procedural defect and the parties had presented no factual 
determinations.168  This reasoning is appropriate because a debtor not 
afforded the opportunity to contribute to the actual litigation of the facts 
due to no fault of his own would have an unfair judgment forced upon 
him. 
                                                                                                                       
parties must be the same or in privity; and (3) the issue litigated must have been 
determined and necessary to support the judgment. 
Id. 
 163. Id. at 8. 
 164. Spartz v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 178 B.R. 45, 48 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (discussing the 
collateral estoppel requirements, including “actually litigated and necessarily determined”). 
 165. Id. at 49 (“Although the debtor did not appear in the state proceeding, he was aware of the 
proceeding, and not precluded by distance, accident or mistake from appearing.  He was afforded an 
adequate opportunity to litigate, and chose not to.”); see also Tracy’s Auto. Corp., slip op. at 7 (“A 
default judgment may be given preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Here, 
defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the fraud issue in the state court 
worthless check case.”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Roberti (In re Roberti), 183 B.R. 991, 1002 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (stating that the appropriate inquiry is whether the party was given an 
“adequate opportunity” to actually litigate the issues). 
 166. Austin v. Pac. Energy & Minerals, Ltd. (In re Austin), 93 B.R. 723, 727 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1988) (stating that the focus is really whether the debtor had an “‘opportunity to present his case or 
litigate the relevant issues’” (quoting Klemens v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 840 F.2d 762, 765 (10th 
Cir. 1988))). 
 167. Austin, 93 B.R. at 728 (refusing to grant collateral estoppel effect to “[d]efault judgments 
which are not entered on consent, or which may be the product of, or tainted by, mistake, fraud, 
clerical error, lack of due process, denial of debtor’s opportunity to a full and fair trial, or other 
similar infirmity”). 
 168. Bankr. No. 93-61642, Adv. No. 93-6238, 1994 WL 127599, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 
24, 1994). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Up to this point this Comment has offered an overview of two types 
of prebankruptcy actions that creditors use to overcome the bankruptcy 
discharge: prepetition waivers and prepetition stipulations.  Further, a 
split in courts has developed regarding the level of enforcement provided 
to prepetition stipulations.  The analysis that follows argues that 
prepetition waivers are not, and should not, be enforceable and that 
prepetition stipulations should be enforceable and given collateral 
estoppel effect.  The discussion more fully explains the difference 
between a waiver and a stipulation and supports the collateral estoppel 
reasoning of Camp Three courts. 
A. Prepetition Waivers of Discharge Are Not Enforceable 
1. The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Authorize the Use of Prepetition 
Waivers of Discharge; Therefore, They Are Unenforceable 
As the bankruptcy system developed in the nineteenth century, it saw 
a series of alternating prodebtor then procreditor legislative acts, until 
finally reaching the Act of 1898, which represented a balance between 
the extremes.169  In the next one hundred years, the Code saw several 
amendments—the most recent made in 2005, which “reflect[s] the credit 
industry’s view that bankruptcy law needed to be re-balanced in favor of 
the creditor interest because it was too often abused by debtors.”170  
Despite the purpose of the 2005 Amendments, the Code has continued to 
be more protective of the debtor in certain contexts, including access to 
discharge for the consumer debtor.171  “The Code is very specific about 
                                                     
 169. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 102. 
Essentially, then, the bankruptcy “system” for the first 109 years after the adoption of the 
Constitution was little more than a series of brief legislative fiats, alternately pro-creditor 
or pro-debtor, accompanied by a growing awareness that a uniform comprise law would 
better serve everyone. . . . 
. . . . 
  The legislation enacted in 1898 represented a series of fine compromises on a host of 
difficult issues. 
Id. 
 170. Id. at 106. 
 171. Explicit protections in the Code have been included for the debtor’s protection against his 
own judgment and the pressure of creditors, most notably, the imposition of the automatic stay, the 
reaffirmation agreement requirements, and the discharge injunction.  See, e.g., Nat’l City Bank v. 
Smyth (In re Smyth), 277 B.R. 353, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (stating that one of the purposes 
of reaffirmation requirements is “to protect debtors from their own bad judgment”). 
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the manner in which a debtor can waive the discharge in bankruptcy.”172  
Only two methods of waiver of discharge are available to the debtor, and 
both must occur postpetition.173  These two methods of waiver are 
mutually exclusive; § 727(a)(10) is applicable to universal discharge, 
while § 524(c) is relevant to waiver of discharge of a single debt.174 
The first method of waiver permitted by the Bankruptcy Code is  
§ 727(a)(10), which states “[t]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge, 
unless—the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the 
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter.”175  In Rul-Lan v. Rul-
Lan (In re Rul-Lan), the creditor-wife argued that the debtor-husband 
had waived his right to the discharge of debts owed to her when they 
reached their property settlement.176  The court noted that waiver via  
§ 727(a)(10) was possible if written and if the court granted approval of 
such waiver after ensuring that the debtor had made a “‘conscious and 
informed judgment . . . as to the consequences thereof.’”177  The court, 
however, also determined that “the appropriate way to waive discharge 
as to a specific debt, as opposed to waiving the discharge in the 
bankruptcy case, is through the use of reaffirmation agreement” and 
therefore declined to approve the waiver asserted by the creditor-wife.178  
This analysis of waiver and the limited use of § 727(a)(10) are accurate 
because it supports the purpose Congress intended.179 
                                                     
 172. Rul-Lan v. Rul-Lan (In re Rul-Lan), 186 B.R. 938, 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). 
 173. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), 727(a)(10) (2006); see also Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Mascoll 
(In re Mascoll), 246 B.R. 697, 706 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2000) (“Congress has provided only two methods 
for a Chapter 7 debtor to waive the dischargeability of specific debts: (1) by executing a 
postbankruptcy written agreement, waiving a discharge of all debts, that is approved by the 
bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10); or (2) by executing a waiver that satisfies the 
reaffirmation agreement requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).”); Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 
B.R. 647, 654 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (stating that Congress authorized two types of postpetition 
waivers, including reaffirmation agreements and waiver of discharge in total). 
 174. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 727.12 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th 
ed. rev. 2009) (“A debtor and creditor should not be permitted to use section 727(a)(10) to avoid the 
reaffirmation provisions.”). 
 175. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) (2006).  The language of § 727(a)(10) is a derivative of the waiver 
contained in the original Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  See The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 14a (“That 
the bankrupt may, before the hearing on such application, waive by writing, filed with the court, his 
right to discharge.”); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 174, ¶ 727.LH[2][j]. 
 176. 186 B.R. at 943 (stating that the wife argued that the order granting relief from the 
automatic stay acted as a waiver of discharge). 
 177. Id. (citing Chilcoat v. Minor (In re Minor), 115 B.R. 690, 693–94 (D. Colo. 1990)). 
 178. Id. 
 179. I mention this briefly because there is some confusion regarding the purpose of § 727(a)(10) 
by attorneys and a minority of courts.  Section 727(a)(10) states: “The court shall grant the debtor a 
discharge, unless—the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the 
order for relief under this chapter.”  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10).  From this section several obvious 
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Congress’s comments regarding § 727(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 do not reveal much about the intent they had in 
enacting that section.180  However, the legislative comments surrounding 
§ 524(a) do help differentiate between the purposes of §§ 524(a)(1) and 
727(a)(10).181  Section 524(a)(1) of the Code provides that a discharge 
will “void[] any judgment . . . whether or not discharge of such debt is 
waived.”182  The legislative history of § 524(a)(1) reveals that the 
“whether or not discharge of such debt is waived” language was included 
“to prevent waiver of discharge of a particular debt, not waiver of 
discharge in toto as permitted under section 727(a)(9) [sic].”183  
Therefore, the universal waiver of discharge of § 727(a)(10) is limited to 
specific circumstances where the parties executed the waiver 
postpetition, memorialized it in writing, and received court approval.184 
The second method, and “the appropriate way to waive discharge as 
to a specific debt,” is to enter into a reaffirmation agreement.185  In an 
agreement to reaffirm a debt, “the debtor promises to repay a prepetition 
debt that would otherwise be discharged at the conclusion of the 
bankruptcy.”186  A debtor will commonly enter into a reaffirmation 
agreement to retain nonexempt personal property.  This typically 
involves a secured debt, but reaffirmation applies to unsecured debts as 
                                                                                                                       
elements are discernible: the waiver must be executed postpetition, it must be in writing, and the 
court must approve the waiver.  Id.  Although the plain language of the statute does not specifically 
state so, the legislative history of the statute indicates it should only be utilized for waiver of 
discharge “in toto.”  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6322; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 80 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5866 (stating 
that the legislative history reveals that the “whether or not discharge of such debt is waived” 
language was included “to prevent waiver of discharge of a particular debt, not waiver of discharge 
in toto as permitted under section 727(a)(9) [sic]”). 
 180. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 98 (In discussing the nine grounds for denial of discharge, the 
Senate stated, “The ninth ground is approval by the court of a waiver of discharge.”). 
 181. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 80. 
 182. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (similar quoted language is also evident in § 524(a)(2) and (3)). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 366; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 80 (emphasis added). 
 184. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10). 
 185. Rul-Lan v. Rul-Lan (In re Rul-Lan), 186 B.R. 938, 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); see also 
Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that 
“reaffirmation represents the only vehicle through which an otherwise dischargeable debt can 
survive”).  Reaffirmation agreements are peculiar in the way that they are treated within the 
Bankruptcy Code.  First, for some unknown reason, a reaffirmation agreement is not considered an 
exception to discharge under § 523(a) but is instead included in § 524, which is entitled “Effect of 
discharge.”  11 U.S.C. § 524.  Yet, even § 524(c) does not plainly state that it authorizes a 
“reaffirmation” agreement.  Id.  The name is actually derived from Rule 4008 of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure.  That Rule provides that a “reaffirmation agreement shall be filed no later 
than 60 days after the first date for the meeting of creditors.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4008. 
 186. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (9th ed. 2009). 
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well.187  Reaffirmation of a secured debt, such as a house or car, is more 
common because the debtor often desires to keep such property.188  Once 
a debtor reaffirms the debt, the creditor is free to collect because the 
reaffirmation revives the debt and makes it fully enforceable.189 
Before the 1898 Amendments to the Code, only common law 
mandated that “[a] promise to pay a debt that had been discharged in 
bankruptcy was enforceable.”190  Many debtors, therefore, were not 
obtaining the fresh start that bankruptcy filing was meant to afford due to 
the aggressive tactics of many creditors.191  To combat these tactics, the 
1973 Report of the Bankruptcy Commission recommended that 
discharge serve as a method of extinguishing debts so that debts may not 
be enforceable due to “a mere reaffirmation.”192  As evidenced by the 
scope of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), Congress did not follow the 
recommendation of the Bankruptcy Commission but instead caved to 
external pressure applied by the credit industry.193  Reform of the 
reaffirmation agreement process, however, was again sought after 
various creditor abuses were exposed,194 and the 1997 Bankruptcy 
Commission recommended the prohibition of agreements to reaffirm 
                                                     
 187. See Jamie Beth Feitlin, Note, Reaffirmation Agreements Between Debtors and Creditors: 
The Past, the Present, & the Future, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 177, 182–86 (1998) (stating 
various reasons why a debtor may want to reaffirm a debt); Jennifer L. Maffett, Comment, Keeping 
the Promise of a Fresh Start: Why Congress Should Grant Debtors a Private Right of Action Against 
Creditors for Abuse of Reaffirmation Agreements, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 95, 99–100 (2001) (listing 
further reasons why a debtor might reaffirm an unsecured debt).  For a view that reaffirmation of 
unsecured debts should be discouraged, see Thomas E. Ray, Debtors Beware: Reaffirmation 
Agreements Can Be Hard to Rescind, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2001, at 10, 10 (citing In re 
Nidiver, 217 B.R. 581, 584 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998)). 
 188. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study 
of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 729–31 (1999) (discussing empirical data that found less 
than ten percent of reaffirmation agreements pertained to unsecured debts). 
 189. In re Jamo, 283 F.3d at 398; see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 262 (“The 
consequence of reaffirmation of a secured debt is that debtors sign a legally binding agreement to 
waive the discharge on a given debt, subjecting themselves once again to losing the collateral and 
being sued for a deficiency claim . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 190. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 259 (“The 1898 Act said nothing about 
reaffirmations.”). 
 191. See id.; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 177 (1973) (stating: “Commission has been informed that 
the legislation has achieved its objective in part, but creditors continue to make advantageous use of 
the financial statements obtained at the time of extending credit by filing or threatening to file 
applications for determination of nondischargeability against bankrupts and accepting a 
reaffirmation in settlement of the litigation of threatened litigation.”). 
 192. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 177. 
 193. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 259. 
 194. See, e.g., id. at 260 (discussing Sears’ use of reaffirmation agreements and its failure to 
comply with the requirements of § 524). 
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unsecured debt and additional restrictions on reaffirmation of secured 
debt.195  In particular, the Commission reprimanded the credit industry 
for the existence of “rogue reaffirmations”196 and coercive 
communications with debtors, which sparked discussions to amend the 
Code to include a private right of action for debtors against creditors who 
had abused the reaffirmation process.197 
In 2005, Congress responded to the concerns of creditor abuse of the 
reaffirmation process by including additional provisions in the Code 
applicable solely to reaffirmation agreements.198  Consequently, an 
agreement that fails to make the proper disclosures under each of the  
§ 524(c) subsections does not strictly comply and is unenforceable as a 
reaffirmation agreement.199  The strict compliance standard is likely 
derived from the language of § 524(c), which states that “[a]n agreement 
between a holder of a claim and the debtor . . . is enforceable . . . whether 
or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if” the subsection 
requirements are achieved.200  The additional conditions of § 524(c) and 
the strict compliance standard ensure that the debtor receives a fresh start 
and makes an educated, independent, and voluntary decision to reaffirm 
a debt.201 
Because Congress specifically enacted two postpetition methods of 
waiving dischargeability of debts, the lack of legislation regarding 
prepetition waivers cannot be an oversight.202  If prepetition waivers 
were considered valid, the bankruptcy courts would be creating an 
exception that is not enumerated by Congress within the Bankruptcy 
Code.203  Congress’s decision not to validate prepetition waivers is 
appropriate because it limits the encroachment creditors may have on the 
                                                     
 195. Id. at 261. 
 196. Culhane & White, supra note 188, at 718. 
 197. See Maffett, supra note 187, at 105. 
 198. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 261. 
 199. See, e.g., Doug Howle’s Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Ethridge (In re Ethridge), 80 B.R. 581, 
586 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (holding the consent judgment unenforceable as a reaffirmation 
agreement because it failed to include a statement that the agreement could be rescinded pursuant to 
§ 524(c)(2)). 
 200. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006) (emphasis added) (requiring that the agreement be voluntary, it 
not impose an undue hardship, the debtor understand the legal effects of the agreement, the debtor 
has not rescinded the agreement by a specified date, and the individual have an opportunity for a 
hearing). 
 201. Nat’l City Bank v. Smyth (In re Smyth), 277 B.R. 353, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 202. See Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 653–54 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“Congress’s 
failure to authorize prepetition waivers of discharge, while at the same time authorizing certain 
prepetition waivers of discharge . . . must be viewed as intentional.”). 
 203. Id. at 653. 
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dischargeability of debts.  This Comment supports the postpetition 
methods to waive discharge because they are properly tailored to uphold 
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code while also protecting “debtors from 
their own misjudgments.”204  A waiver under § 727(a)(10), for example, 
must be approved by the bankruptcy court, and generally debtors must 
prove they have made an informed decision regarding the effect of such a 
waiver.205  Further, § 524(c) has extensive requirements for a debtor to 
reaffirm.206  It is obvious that Congress drafted § 524(c) so that the 
debtor is fully apprised of the consequences of reaffirmation and is not 
unduly pressured to reaffirm by the creditor.207  Even though the debtor 
has the option to reaffirm, the debtor has “some protection against his 
own (potentially) short-sighted decisions.”208  In contrast, a prepetition 
waiver is often entered into before bankruptcy is even contemplated, and, 
therefore, the debtor will have no understanding of the effects such an 
agreement may have in the future.  Prepetition waivers should be 
unenforceable, as the majority of courts have determined,209 because they 
                                                     
 204. Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral Undercurrents of Debtor-
Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 21 (2006).  “Legal rules protect us from ourselves by insisting 
that legal formalities accompany decisions where we are prone to make systematic misjudgments.”  
Id. at 18; see also Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
1393, 1403 (1985) (“Bankruptcy’s fresh-start policy . . . provides substantially broader protection to 
debtors” than other policy options that were considered). 
 205. In deciding whether to approve a waiver of discharge, some courts will only do so if the 
debtor made a conscious and informed decision regarding the waiver.  See, e.g., Rul-Lan v. Rul-Lan 
(In re Rul-Lan), 186 B.R. 938, 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that “[s]uch waiver ‘must 
present a conscious and informed judgment by the debtor as to the consequences thereof’” (quoting 
In re Mapother, 53 B.R. 433, 435–36 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985))). 
 206. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006); see also supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 207. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 80 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5866; see also In 
re Catron, 186 B.R. 194, 196 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (“It is evident from the literal language of the 
statute that ‘Congress was greatly concerned that a debtor waiving dischargeability of a particular 
debt be afforded the procedural protections provided in § 524(c), regardless of any pre-existing 
agreement as to nondischargeability.’” (quoting Chilcoat v. Minor (In re Minor), 115 B.R. 690, 695 
(D. Colo. 1990))). 
 208. Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir. 2002).  At 
first glance § 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code seems like the valid and immutable discharge waiver 
creditors had long desired, but further investigation reveals a major caveat—the reaffirmation 
agreement can be rescinded by the debtor.  Section 524(c)(4) allows a debtor to rescind a 
reaffirmation agreement before discharge or within sixty days of filing the agreement, whichever is 
later.  11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4). 
 209. See, e.g., Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 652 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Cotten v. 
Cotten (In re Cotten), 318 B.R. 583, 587 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2004) (“Certainly, waivers of a 
discharge have been held to be unenforceable.”); Lewis v. Trump (In re Trump), 309 B.R. 585, 593 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (“[P]repetition agreements to waive the benefits of a bankruptcy discharge 
are void, and this Court is not bound by this language.”); Hester v. Daniel (In re Daniel), 290 B.R. 
914, 920 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003) (“‘Further, courts have not permitted pre-petition waivers of 
protection afforded by a bankruptcy case to be self-executing.’” (quoting In re Shady Grove Tech 
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overly burden the debtor’s chance at a fresh start.  This burden is in 
direct conflict with the long-established purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Further, contrary to its postpetition counterparts, prepetition waivers 
offer debtors no protective measures from creditors and the debtors’ own 
bad judgment. 
2. Prepetition Waivers of Discharge Are Unenforceable Because They 
Violate the Fresh-Start Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code 
“[M]odern bankruptcy law is premised on the idea that a fresh start 
should be available to honest debtors, even when their own bad judgment 
caused their financial difficulties.”210  As expressed in Part II, the idea of 
a “fresh start” is a central purpose of the American bankruptcy system, 
and this Comment does not question its precedent.211  Instead, the heart 
of this discussion is based upon two opposing public policies: the 
longstanding American tradition of freedom to contract versus the fresh-
start purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.212  In Klingman v. Levinson, the 
Seventh Circuit stated in dictum that “[f]or public policy reasons, a 
debtor may not contract away the right to a discharge in bankruptcy.”213  
That statement has been extended and interpreted by courts to mean that 
prepetition waivers of discharge, whether for a single debt or all debts, 
“are void, offending the policy of promoting a fresh start for individual 
debtors.”214  In Doug Howle’s Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Ethridge (In re 
Ethridge), for example, the parties entered into a consent judgment, 
                                                                                                                       
Ctr. Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 216 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998), opinion supplemented, 227 B.R. 
422 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998))); Doug Howle’s Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Ethridge (In re Ethridge), 80 
B.R. 581, 586 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (stating “that the provisions of the consent judgment which 
pertain to the waiver of Defendant’s right to discharge are void”). 
 210. Baird, supra note 204, at 31; see also Maffett, supra note 187, at 130 (“The law should 
enable the bankruptcy system to promote some success of allowing debtors a fresh start from which 
they can rebuild and return as dependable and valuable consumers in the economy of the country.”). 
 211. See Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical 
Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 53–89 (1986) (discussing the 
evolution of the fresh start).  But see Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of 
Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 67 (2006) (discussing whether consumers are 
financially rehabilitated after bankruptcy). 
 212. See Ethridge, 80 B.R. at 586 (following the argument posited by the plaintiff); see also 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1404 
(1985) (stating that “making discharge nonwaivable raises troubling implications” such as 
contravention of the freedom to contract). 
 213. 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 214. Marra, Gerstein & Richman v. Kroen (In re Kroen), 280 B.R. 347, 351 (Bankr. D. N.J. 
2002) (citing Hayhoe, 226 B.R. at 651); see also Herz v. Steil (In re Steil), Bankr. No. 05-0207, 
Adv. No. 05-9108, 2006 WL 2662694, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Aug. 14, 2006) (adopting the 
reasoning from In re Kroen). 
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requiring that the debtor “would not seek to discharge the judgment” and 
“the judgment would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.”215  The 
plaintiff explicitly argued “that a party may agree to forego a legal right, 
[and] that such an agreement creates a binding contract.”216  The court, 
however, concluded that the fresh start in bankruptcy would be upheld 
over the freedom to contract.217 
The view expressed by the bankruptcy court in Ethridge has been 
widely accepted by other courts,218 and despite the limitation on the 
freedom to contract, the view represents, on balance, the best outcome.  
If, for example, the courts chose instead to uphold the freedom to 
contract, creditors would habitually include prepetition waivers in every 
agreement.  “[T]hen creditors would essentially have the power to nullify 
the fresh start provided by the Bankruptcy Code.”219  Debtors would 
leave “bankruptcy owing nearly as much as they did before they filed,”220 
so the entire purpose of the Code would be undermined.  Therefore, for 
public policy reasons, prepetition waivers of discharge are 
unenforceable. 
B. Prepetition Stipulations Involving Discharge Exceptions Should Be 
Entitled to Collateral Estoppel Effect 
The discussion above established that prepetition waivers of 
discharge are unenforceable.  But isn’t a prepetition stipulation in 
essence a prepetition waiver?  Although some courts have failed to see a 
distinction,221 this Comment considers a prepetition stipulation different 
than a prepetition waiver because it requires additional factual 
determinations.222  It should be noted, however, that a general stipulation 
                                                     
 215. 80 B.R. at 585. 
 216. Id. at 586. 
 217. Id. (discussing the right of a party “to forego a legal right” but determining that in these 
circumstances such a decision would be “contrary to the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
 218. See generally Lichtenstein v. Barbanel, 161 F. App’x 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2005); Hayhoe, 226 
B.R. at 654; Barnett v. Rich (In re Rich), 401 B.R. 281, 288 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009); Kroen, 280 
B.R. at 351; In re Nieves, 246 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000); Chilcoat v. Minor (In re 
Minor), 115 B.R. 690, 694–96 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). 
 219. Ethridge, 80 B.R. at 586. 
 220. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 8, at 259 (discussing how “debtors are not like new 
babies” but are often “tangled with some of the same debt that sank them the first time around”). 
 221. See, e.g., Hayhoe, 226 B.R. at 653 (“Consequently, a state court stipulated judgment where 
the debtor waives his right to discharge is unenforceable as against public policy.”). 
 222. Shaw Steel, Inc. v. Morris (In re Morris), Nos. 97 B 39268, 98 A 00121, 1998 WL 355510, 
at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 30, 1998). 
An agreement to waive the dischargeability of a debt is not enforceable as a matter of 
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regarding dischargeability, without stipulation to the underlying facts, is 
not enforceable under the analysis offered here.  For example, in 
Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), a debtor 
and creditor entered into a consent judgment for $220,000 that contained 
the following language: “Defendants acknowledge that the Amended 
Complaint includes allegations of fraud, and acknowledge and agree that 
the obligations imposed upon Defendants by this agreement shall be non-
dischargeable in any bankruptcy, regardless of the party that is brought 
into bankruptcy and regardless of whether the bankruptcy is voluntary or 
involuntary.”223  Although the stipulation stated that it was based upon 
allegations of fraud, such a bare assertion will not constitute a sufficient 
determination of fact by the state court to conclude that the debt was of 
the nature required by § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6).224  Consequently, it is not 
enough to simply state that the debt is nondischargeable as a matter of 
law.225  Also, it is insufficient to specifically state in the consent 
judgment the section under which the debt would be nondischargeable—
for instance, “this debt is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4).”226  
As a result of such inadequate drafting, in dischargeability proceedings 
the bankruptcy court will refuse to grant any collateral estoppel effect 
and will “make independent findings regarding the factual basis 
underlying the initial incurring of the debt” because the state judgment 
does not contain the requisite factual specificity.227  Such bare assertions 
do not contain factual stipulations; therefore the judgment is in essence a 
prepetition waiver of discharge masquerading as a prepetition stipulation.  
This type of state court judgment should not be given collateral estoppel 
effect and is not supported by this Comment. 
The analysis that follows supports the view expressed by Camp 
Three courts, which generally grant collateral estoppel effect to state 
court judgments if the state law elements of collateral estoppel are 
established.  Camp Three is favorable because it grants issue-preclusive 
effect to state court judgments more liberally than the other two camps, 
                                                                                                                       
public policy.  This is distinct from a factual stipulation entered into between parties in a 
prior piece of litigation which may properly serve as the basis for application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion in later litigation between them. 
Id. 
 223. 393 B.R. 522, 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000). 
 224. Id. at 537. 
 225. Doug Howle’s Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Ethridge (In re Ethridge), 80 B.R. 581, 585 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (noting that the stipulation merely stated “the judgment would not be 
dischargeable in bankruptcy”). 
 226. Giaimo v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 227. Ethridge, 80 B.R. at 587. 
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and Camp Three courts will, when appropriate, grant collateral estoppel 
effect to default judgments.  Further, recall that the factual stipulation 
must not only establish the collateral estoppel requirements but must also 
establish the elements of the § 523(a) claim to be enforceable.  With 
those conditions met, three main reasons are offered for granting 
collateral estoppel effect to state court judgments that contain 
stipulations to the underlying facts. 
1. Collateral Estoppel Promotes Public Policy Considerations Such as 
Judicial Economy 
“Applying collateral estoppel is logically consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown and the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy courts while at the same time encouraging judicial 
economy.”228  If the parties know that the consent judgment they reach in 
the state court proceeding will be entitled to collateral estoppel effect, 
they will “present their strongest arguments” at trial and the record, if 
reviewed by the bankruptcy court, will support the outcome.229  Because 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability 
of seventeen out of twenty exceptions,230 there is no reason to suspect 
“that the bankruptcy court will be any more fair or accurate than the state 
court in the determination of the facts.”231  Therefore, allowing a 
bankruptcy court to rely on a state court determination permits the 
bankruptcy court to conserve time and energy.232  Also, not only will the 
bankruptcy courts conserve resources but the parties will also be 
prevented from enduring “vexatious litigation.”233  The public policy 
justification for economy is also especially relevant to debtors who have 
already sustained a financial burden and do not want to exit the 
bankruptcy process with attorney’s fees compromising their fresh start. 
                                                     
 228. Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 229. Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Spilman, 656 F.2d at 
228).  Spilman explained that “[c]ollateral estoppel is applied to encourage the parties to present 
their best arguments on the issues in question in the first instance and thereby save judicial time.”  
656 F.2d at 228. 
 230. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)–(19) (2006). 
 231. Spilman, 656 F.2d at 228. 
 232. Baldwin v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 249 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Relying on the 
state court’s determination allows the bankruptcy court to conserve judicial resources.”). 
 233. Id. at 919–20 (stating that collateral estoppel protects “litigants from harassment by 
vexatious litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cobb v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 271 B.R. 877, 
883 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002) (“The purpose of the collateral estoppel doctrine is to protect parties 
from multiple lawsuits, prevent the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and conserve judicial 
resources.”). 
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2. Collateral Estoppel Avoids a Potential Chilling Effect on State Court 
Consent Judgments 
Bankruptcy courts should grant state court stipulated judgments 
collateral estoppel effect to prevent a chilling effect.  If, instead, the 
majority of courts applied the Camp One reasoning—consent judgments 
should not be given issue-preclusive effect—it would be unlikely that 
state courts would expend much time and energy in considering 
bankruptcy dischargeability considerations.  “Under such 
circumstances . . . ‘[a] chilling effect on consent judgments and 
settlements might result if the court were to ignore [] a clear and 
unambiguous expression of the parties’ intent,’”234 favoring the 
enforcement of the consent judgment.  Such an effect could have two 
consequences.  First, the bankruptcy courts would have an increase in 
dischargeability proceedings because parties would likely ignore the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the states and instead file a dischargeability 
motion in bankruptcy court, if available.  Second, disregard of factual 
stipulations agreed upon by the parties and incorporated in a state court 
consent judgment may “do violence to judicial finality.”235  After 
completion of the state court proceeding, the conclusiveness of the 
judgment would be indefinite.236  If the defendant debtor soon after filed 
for bankruptcy, the matter would have to be settled again with a consent 
judgment entered in bankruptcy court—if the debtor was willing—or the 
plaintiff might have to prove the debtor’s guilt, making the prior state 
court judgment valueless.  To maintain the consistency and integrity of 
state court judgments, bankruptcy courts should afford those judgments 
collateral estoppel effect.237 
3. The Consequences of Granting Collateral Estoppel Effect to the 
Discharge Exceptions Are Negligible 
Promotion of the liberal view of Camp Three will not cause any far-
reaching effects.  If a creditor and debtor stipulate to facts that have no 
relation to one of the discharge exceptions, the stipulation will have no 
                                                     
 234. Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1065 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting 
First Ga. Bank v. Halpern (In re Halpern), 50 B.R. 260, 263 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985)). 
 235. Halpern, 50 B.R. at 262. 
 236. Cobb, 271 B.R. at 883 (“The purpose of the collateral estoppel doctrine is to protect parties 
from multiple lawsuits, prevent the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and conserve judicial 
resources.”). 
 237. In re Baldwin, 249 F.3d at 920 (discussing the public policy behind collateral estoppel). 
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effect.  It will be an unenforceable prepetition waiver that the majority of 
courts have held violate public policy.238  A properly executed stipulation 
to the underlying facts in a state court proceeding, however, does not run 
afoul the fresh-start purpose of the Code because the stipulations are 
limited in number and subject by § 523(a).  Even though creditors may 
succeed in these situations more often than debtors, the nature of the 
debts is such that debtors should be held accountable for their 
payments.239 
The only real consequence that application of the Camp Three view 
will have is that a few more state court consent judgments will be 
granted issue-preclusive effect.  Because Camp One represents the view 
of the minority, the change to a more liberal view by those courts will be 
of small significance.  Also, courts currently following the view 
expressed in Camp Two will have to change very little about their 
jurisprudence.  Indeed, the courts will follow the same analysis but will 
grant collateral estoppel effect if the state court collateral estoppel 
requirements are present and the state court consent judgment pleads the 
elements of the § 523(a) claim.  The focal point of the analysis is no 
longer the parties’ intent.  Therefore, the debtor is adequately protected 
through the limited availability of the circumstances when a stipulation 
may be used and even further protected by the requirements that the 
parties must establish before collateral estoppel is available.  
Consequently, all bankruptcy courts should adopt the liberal view of 
Camp Three courts, which grant collateral estoppel effect to state court 
judgments when the elements are present and do not require any special 
indication of intent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The bankruptcy discharge is a highly guarded privilege from which 
consumer debtors greatly benefit.  It represents a fundamental purpose of 
the American bankruptcy system, which allows the debtor to have a fresh 
start at life, free from prior financial encumbrances.  Although 
bankruptcy law often relieves debtors from their own bad financial 
judgments, the law also protects debtors who encounter substantial 
misfortunes, such as extensive medical bills or rising debts due to job 
loss.  To use the bankruptcy process and be afforded a discharge, the 
unfortunate debtor need only be honest.  The Bankruptcy Code has been 
                                                     
 238. See sources cited supra note 211. 
 239. See supra note 60. 
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developed to protect the honest debtor and, in some circumstances, will 
dismiss a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy in bad faith.  Despite the 
preference for honest debtors, a debtor who has been less than an upright 
citizen before filing for bankruptcy can use the Code.  The fresh start of 
this debtor, however, will be limited because Congress has determined 
that certain debts are not dischargeable and many of those debts are 
incurred through some kind of culpable conduct.  Beyond those 
exceptions, the bankruptcy court will discharge the debtor’s personal 
liability for all remaining prepetition debts.  The bankruptcy discharge, 
therefore, represents an extremely prodebtor practice.  It is of no surprise 
then that creditors have made various prepetition attempts to limit the 
effect of the bankruptcy discharge so that less loss is transferred to them. 
One way creditors try to lower their risk is by requiring debtors to 
sign a prepetition waiver of discharge.  As evident from this Comment, 
prepetition waivers of a specific debt or all debt are unenforceable.  
Congress permits only two types of waiver and both must occur 
postpetition.  First, the debtor may make a universal waiver of discharge 
pursuant to § 727(a)(10).  If the debtor enters into a universal waiver, the 
court will not discharge any of the prepetition debts.  Therefore, the use 
of universal waivers is rare because they require judicial approval and 
they defeat the fresh-start purpose of bankruptcy.  The second type of 
postpetition waiver that Congress permitted allows a debtor to waive 
discharge of a specific debt under § 524(c).  The debtor will enter into a 
reaffirmation agreement with the creditor, which causes the personal 
liability attached to the debt to survive discharge.  The Bankruptcy Code, 
however, carefully controls the use and form of reaffirmation 
agreements.  Since Congress established two ways to waive debts 
postpetition, courts conclude by negative implication that prepetition 
waivers are unenforceable.  But the conclusion is also supported by the 
fresh-start purpose of bankruptcy. 
The other method creditors use prepetition is a stipulation to the 
underlying facts in a state court judgment.  Although a stipulation closely 
resembles an unenforceable prepetition waiver because it can occur in 
state court before the debtor has filed a petition, the two are substantively 
different.  Factual stipulations are limited to the discharge exceptions 
listed in § 523(a), which have been enacted for various public policy 
reasons and are construed narrowly against the creditor.  Therefore, for 
the bankruptcy court to enforce, the stipulation must establish each 
element of the dischargeability exception.  Conversely, a blanket 
provision in a consent decree that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523 
is in essence a prepetition waiver and is unenforceable.  The discussion 
further compared and analyzed the collateral estoppel effect granted by 
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state courts to these stipulations, which in general fall into one of three 
camps.  Collateral estoppel effect that is generally applied and does not 
require any specific intent is preferred.  This view is favorable because it 
upholds the value of state court judgments, encourages judicial economy, 
and allows a creditor to know that the debt is nondischargeable, bringing 
finality to the process. 
